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S"GB.:\IARINE .:\IIXES. 
The I-Iague Convention ""VIII, 1907, relative to the 
laying of nuto1natic contact sub1narine 1nines 'vas ad-
Inittecl to be tentative. In vie"~ of this fact should this 
convention be revised? 
(a) Should the use of subnutrine tnines be absolutely 
prohibited? 
(b) If sub1narine 1nines arc not prohibited, should un-
anchored auton1atic contact sub1narine 1nines be pro-
hibited? 
(c) Should there be a regulation· as to the area 'vithin 
'vhich 1nines 1nay be placed? 
(d) "\"\~hat precautions should be taken in laying 
anchored and unanchored con tact 1nines ? 
(e) Should a neutral State be forbidden to laY nunes 
"~ithin its territorial "·aters? ~ 
(f) Should article 6 be rene,ved? 
(g) Should the use of torpedoes be further regulated? 
CONCLUSION. 
(a) The usc of sub1narine 1nines should not be abso-
lutely prohibited. 
(b) The use of unanchored auto1nntic contact 1nines 
should be prohibited or 1nore definitely restrictcd. 1 
(c) The area 'vithin "·hich 1nines 1nay be placed should 
be deter1nined by regulation. 
(d) "\"\~hen anchored auto1natic contact 1nincs nre enl-
ployed, every possible precaution n1ust be taken for the 
security of peaceful shipping, including-
!. An advance notice to foreign Governn1.ents and to 
mariners, specifying the general Ji1ni ts of the 1nined area. 
1 Using the phraseology of the Hague convention and introducing the proposed 
changes, the following form may he su~gestecl as meeting present requirements and 
opinions: It is forbidden to lay unanehored automatic contaet mines except when they 
are so constmcted as to become harmless one-half hour after those who laid them have 
lost control over them, and in every case before rassing outside the area of belligerent 
activities. 
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2. Provision for \Varning peaceful vessels approaching 
the n1ined area. 
3. Specification of the time during 'vhich the mines 
'vill be dangerous. 
(e) The laying of 1nines hy a neutral State should not 
be prohibited. 
(j) Article 6 of Convention \'III should not be con-
tinued in force. 
(g) The use of torpedoes should not be further but 
should be less regula ted if any change is made in the 
convention. 
~OTES. 
Jllines in the Russo-Japanese ll ' ar, 1904-5. - The use 
of sub1narine 1nines in the Russo-Japanese \Yar of 
1904-5 particularly attracted the attention of the 'vorld 
to dangers of the use of these instru1nen ts of \Var. 
~fines had been used before this ti1ne, but not in such a 
general1nanner. ''rhether or not 1nines \Vere deliberately 
allo,ved to drift out to sea, it seems probable that a large 
number of 1nines did dritt about in the \Vaters in the 
neighborhood of Port Arthur. The reports seen1 to show 
that many 1nines \Vere found outside the imn1ediate area 
of the belligerent activities. As the danger fron1 drifting 
contact n1ines n1ight be equally great to the party placing 
the mines, it is di-fficult to believe that mines ,vhich \vould 
not become har1nless after a fixed time \vould be set 
adrift in an area of general operations, even if there \vere 
no regulation against the use of submarine mines. 
The destruction of the Japanese battleship llatsuse on 
~fay 15, 1904, \Vas reported by Ad1niral Togo, as follo,vs: 
"\Vhile the fleet was watching the enemy off Port Arthur, the Hatsuse 
struck an enemy's mine. Her rudder was damaged, and she sent a 
message for a ship to tow her. One was being sent. when another 
message brought the lamentable report that the Hatsuse had struck 
another mine and had sunk immediately after. She was then 10 
knots off the Liau-tie-Shan promontory. There was no enemy iii 
sight, and her loss must have been caused by a mine or submarine. 
Later it \Vas declared that the Ilatsuse \Vas sunk by a 
submarine 1nine. The destruction of the Ilatsuse by a 
mine at a point 10 miles fro1n Port Arthur caused much 
discussion. It \Vas admitted that belligerents had a right 
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to carry on \\'fir on the high sen, but it \\'as also con-
tended that neutrals had a right to safe passage on the 
high sen \\'hen not \\·ithin the nren of nctunl active 
hostilities. It "·as contended that if a neutral vessel 
had passed over the san1e spot it \\·ould hn ve been de-
stroyed as \\·as the Ilatsuse. Later, in 1907, the Chinese 
delegate at the Conference n t The I-I ague explained 
that 1nnny Chinese vessels had been destroyed by 
1nines drifting about the sen, son1e eYen entering the 
littoral sea. The Chinese delegate reckoned the nu1nber 
of Chinese "·ho had lost their lives as 500 to 600. 
It \\·as reported that the Russian vessel 1.,. rnissPi, 
after lnying 389 1nines, w·as itself destroyed by the 
390th. The Russian vessel Petropavlovsl~ seen1s to have 
been destroyed by a n1ine "·hen near Port Arthur. It is 
of course i1npossible to deter1uine "·hether these vessels 
\\·ere ·destroyed by n1ines laid by Russian or by Japanese 
forces. 
During the Russo-J apnnese \·r ar the area in "·hich 1nine 
laying \\'"as carried on w·as re1note fron1 the usual routes 
of conunerce. The possible effects of contact 1nines 
drifting about the English Channel as in the neighbor-
hood of Port Arthur \\'"US pictured effectively by son1e 
\\Titers, and attention 'vas called to the dangers fro1n such 
forn1s of \\'"nrfnre and the necessity of regulation of 
the use of sub1nnrine 1nines beca1ne evident. 
Propositions at The Ilague in 1907.-The British dele-
gation at the Hague conference in 1907, follo,ving its 
instructions, offered the follo,ving proposition, 'vhich 
became the basis of 1nuch discussion: 
ARTICLE 1. L'emploi de mines sous-marines automatiques de contact 
non mouillees est interclit. 
ART. 2. Les mines sous-marines automatiques de contact, qui, en 
quittant leur point de mouillage, ne deviennent pas inoffensives, sont 
pro hi bees. 
ART. 3. L'emploi des mines sous-marines automatiques de contact 
pour etablir ou maintenir un blocus de commerce est interdit. 
ART. 4. Les belligerants ne pourront se servir de n1ines sous-marines 
automatiques de contact que dans leurs eaux territoriales ou celles de 
leurs ennemis. Toutefois, devant les ports de guerre fortifies cette 
zone pourra etre ctendue jusqu'a une distance de dix milles des canons 
a terre, a charge, pour le belligerant qui poserait ces mines, d'en donner 
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avis aux neutres, et de prendre en outre les dispositions que les cir-
constances lui permettront pour eviter, dans la mesure possible, que 
les navires de commerce qui n'auraient pu etre touches par cet avis 
soient exposes a etre detruits. 
Seuls les ports possedant au moins un grand bassin a radoub et qui 
seront munis d' outillage necessaire a la construction et la reparation 
de vaisseaux de guerre et dans lesquels un personnel d'ou\Tiers payes 
par l'Etat pour effectuer Ia construction et Ia reparation de vaisseaux 
de guerre est entretenu en temps de paix, seront consideres comme 
entrant dans la categorie de ports de guerre. 
ART. 5. D'une fa~on generale, les precautions necessaires seront 
prises pour sauvegarder les navires neutres qui se li\Tent a un commerce 
licite; et il est a desirer que, en raison des dispositions memes prises 
dans la construction des mines sous-marines automatiques de contact, 
ces engins cessent d'etre dangereux au bout d'un delai convenable. 
ART. 6. A la fin de la guerre les belligerants se communiqueront 
mutuellement dans ]a mesure possible les informations necessaires 
quanta !'emplacement des mines automatiques de contact que chacun 
aura posees le long des cotes de l'autre, et chaque belligerant devra 
proceder dans le plus bref delai a l'enlevement des mines qui se trouvent 
dans ces eaux territoriales. (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de 
la Paix, Tome III, p. 660.) 
Italy proposed to limit the life of unanchored automatic 
contact submarine n1ines to one hour after they were 
launched and to per1nit the use of such anchored contact 
mines only as should become harmless on breaking adrift. 
Japan 'vould limit the use of unanchored mines to the 
immediate sphere of hostilities and make the life by 
construction such as to offer no danger to neutrals. 
The X ether lands delegation introduced certain amend-
ments looking particularly to the use of mines for pur-
poses of defense by neutrals. 
Brazil offered an amendment of somewhat similar 
purport. 
Spain p,lso made a proposition to limit the mines to 
terri to rial 'va ters. 
Gern1any suggested the addition of the follo,ving 
clause: 
La pose des mines automatiques de contact sera aussi permise sur 
le theatre de la guerre; sera considere comme theatre de la guerre 
l'espace de mer sur lequel se fait ou vient de se faire une operation de 
guerre ou sur lequel une pareille operation pourra avoir lieu par suite 
de la presence ou de !'approche des forces armees des deux helligerants. 
(Ibid, p. 663.) 
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The United States delegation offered an a1nenchnent 
as follo,vs: 
1. Unanchored automatic contact mines are prohibited. 
2. Anchored automatic conta.ct mines, which do not become innocu-
ous on getting adrift, are prohibited. 
3. If anchored automatic contact mines are used within belligerant 
jurisdiction or within the area of immediate belligerent activitie~, due 
precautions shall be taken for the safety of neutrals. (Ibid., p. 664.) 
Russia added the provision in regard to torpedoes and 
approved form of n1ines: 
l. Les belligerants se serYiront de n1ines automatiques de contact 
sons-marines amarrees construites de fa<;on a ce que, en tant que cela 
est possible, elles deviennent inoffensives, lorsqu'elles auront rompu 
leurs amarres. 
2. LeuT mines flottantes automatiques seront construites de fa<;on a 
ce que, en tant que cela est possible, elles deviennent inoffen~ives 
apres un certain delai apres leur lancement. 
3. Les torpilles seront construites de fa<;on a ce que, en tant que cela 
est possible, elles deviennent inoffensives lorsqu'elles auront manque 
leur but. 
4. Un delai suffisant sera accorde aux Gouvernements pour mettre 
en usage les appareils de mines perfectionnes. (Ibid., p. 664.) 
A synaptical arrange1nent of all the propositions 'vas 
made and then various a1nendments 'vere suggested to 
the ne'v arrangement. 
Several suggestions "'"ere 1nade with vie,v to allowing 
mines 'vithin the area of immedi~te belligerent operations 
or ,vith view .. to making a definite limit from the coast 
for the e1nployment of mines. Ten miles "\vas frequently 
suggested. 
The propositions in general sho'v a drift from the idea 
entertained by 1nany at the commencement of the dis-
cussion, ,vhich idea 'vas favorable to absolute prohibition 
of the use of mines. 
l\1. I-Iagerup, the presiding officer of the subcom1nittee, 
summarized the propositions before the committee in the 
follo,ving manner: 
Les que:;;tions dont nous aurons a nous occuper sont les suivantes: 
Premiere question.-Certaines especes de mines ne doivent-elles pas 
etre !'objet d'une interdiction absolue, qu'elles soient placees dan:: des 
eaux territoriales ou en pleine mer? · 
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La proposition britannique interdit: 
(a) Les mines sous-marines automatiques de contact non amarn3es; 
les amendernents italiens et japonais (annexes 10 et 11) font exception 
pour l~s mines qui deviennent inoffensives un certain temps apres leur 
immersion. L'amendement italien fixe ce temps a une heure, tandis 
que l'amendement japonais n'indique pas de fixation. 
(b) Sont en outre interdites, d'apres la proposition britannique, les 
mines qui en quittant leur point de mouillage ne deviennent pas 
inoffensives. La meme interdiction est, dans d'autres termes, con-
tenue dans l'amendement italien et l'amendement espagnol. (Annexes 
lO et 14.) La difference entre ce dernier amendement et les dis-
positifs sus-mentionnes est que l'amendement espagnol presuppose 
une espece d'autorisation internat~onale pour le placement de mines 
automatiques de contact. 
Seconde question.-Le placement de mines sons-marines ne doit-il 
pas etre interdit en pleine mer? 
La proposition anglaise, article 4, n~pund affirmativement, sous cette 
reserve qu'elle autorise la pose de mines en mer jusqu'a dix milles 
devant certains ports de guerre. La proposition contient en outre une 
definition de ce qu'on entend par port de guerre. L'amendement de 
Ia Delegation des Pays-Bas propose de supprimer cette definition. 
Troisi'eme question.-Dans quelles conditions les Etats peuvent-ils 
placer des mines dans leurs eaux territoriales? 
Cette question n'est traitee par la proposition britannique qu'en 
tant qu'elle concerne les bclligerants, tandis que ]es amendements, 
proposes par les Delegations des P3.ys-Bas et du Bresil, visent aussi 
les neutres. La proposition britannique dans ses articles 4-G prescrit 
d'une fa90n generale des precautions a prendre pour sauvegarder la 
navigadon pacifique contre les dangers des tnines. Sur ce point, il y 
a cette difference entre la proposition britannique et l'amendement 
neerlandais que la premiere demande aux belligerants de donner aux 
neutres un avis special du placement des mines, tandis que l'amende-
ment neerlandais se contente d'une publication genera.le. La propo-
sition de la Delegation de Pays-Bas qui traite egalement des neutres 
contient d 'ailleurs les memes prescriptions pour le placement des mines 
par les neutres et par les belligerants. II est en outre a remarquer que 
cette proposition soumet tout placement de mines, soit par les bellige-
rants, soit par les neutres, a la restriction que les detroits qui unissent 
deux mers libres ne peuvent pas etre barn~s. Pour le reste des disposi-
tions proposees par les differentes d8legations, il convient d'envisager 
separement les differentes hypotheses su.ivantes: 
(a) Placement de mines par un belligerant dans ses propres eaux 
territoriales. · 
(b) Placement de mines par un belligerant dans les eaux de l'adver-
saire. L'amenclement espagnol (annexe 14) le soun1et :\ la condition 
que le belli?e~ant y exerce un pouvoir effectif. La proposition britan-
niqua (article 3) prescrit de son cote que l'emploi de mines pour eta-
bl.ir ou Inaintenir un hlocus est interdit. 
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(c) Placmnent de a1ines dans les eaux territoriales des neutres. 
L'amendement IH~erlandais assimile ce cas completement au place-
ment de 1nines par les belligerants, tandis que l'anwndement bresil.ien 
(annexe 13) IJe parait admettre pour les neutres que le placement de 
n1ines explosant sous l'action d 'une impulsion provoquee en con-
naissance de cause par des autorites d'Etat. C'et amendement con-
tient du reste des prescriptions speciales quant a l'avertissenlent a 
faire et la responsabilite pour le deplacement des 1nines. 
La quatriEnne question est ce1le Yisee par l'article 7 de I 'an1endement 
neerlandais (annexe 12). Y a-t-il lieu d'etablir par une convention 
internationale des regles pour l'indemnite en cas de dommage cause par 
les 1nines? (Ibid., p. 522.) 
Preamble of the I-Iague con'vention.-The prea1nble of the 
Hague convention relative to the laying of auto1nat.ic 
contact sub1narine 1nines sho\\~s that those \\~ho dre\\~ the 
convention did not regard its rn·ovisions as anything 
more than tentative. The for1n of the pre~unble is dis-
tinctly favorable to 1nuch 1nore rigid regulations than 
those en1bodied in the conYention itself. The prean1ble 
states that the po\Yers: 
Inspired by the principle of the freedon1 of sea routes, the common 
highway of all nations; seeing that, although in the existing state of 
affairs it is impossible to forbid the en1ployment of automatic contaet 
submarine mines, it is nevertheless desirable to restrict and regulate 
their employment in order to Initigate the severity of war and to ensure, 
as far as possible, to peaceful navigation the security to which it is 
entitled, despite the existence of war; until such time as it is found 
possible to formulate rules on the subject which shall ensure to the 
interests involved all the guaranties desirable; have resolved to con-
clude a convention for this purpose, and have appointed the following 
as their plenipotentiaries. 
Tentative character of the con1.:ention .-X ot only does the 
preamble of the convention itself and n1any of the discus-
sions sho\\~ that the convention relative to the lnying of 
automatic contact sub1narine mines is tentative in char-
acter, but some of the reserves made by States and the 
declaration of Great Britain sho"~ this. (Deuxie1ne Con-
ference Internationale de la Paix, ton1e 1, p~1ge 281.) 
Types of mines.-<Jfines are generally clnssified as an-
chored nnd unanchored or free. ....-\..nchored 1nines vary in 
construction and operation, but usually are such as are 
under control so that they may be discharged at the \vill 
of an operator on shore, or such ns explode on contact 
\Yith a vessel or other hard body. Unanchored 1nincs also 
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vary in construction and operation. Som~ have a rca-
sana bly defini tc limit of cffecti Yi ty, aft~r 'Yhich they sink 
or otherwise become har1nlcss. Son1<.~ unanchored mines 
seem to be effcctiYc for long periods. 
Controlled anchored 1nines.-N aturally there has been 
little objection to the use of controlled anchored mines. 
An anchored mine "~hich can only be discharged at the 
"~ill of an operator n1ay differ little fro1n a shell from a 
gun. The shell may be ai1ned to strike the Ycsse l, 'Yhile 
the n1ine may be placed so that it "'"ill be struck by a 
vessel, but "~in explode only "'"hen the operator in charge 
determines and at other times "~ill be har1nless. Such 
mines do not necessarily in1pcril neutrnl or innocent ship-
ping. .A .. s these n1ines arc under control of the opera tor, 
it is generally held that the State placing such mines is 
responsible for their use. The use of such mines has not 
met 'vith much opposition, but has been generally ap-
proved. 
Anchored contact rnine8.-.. A .. nchored contact 1nincs be-
ing such as explode on contact "'"ith a vessel, 1nay be dan-
gerous to any vessel, 'Yhcthcr lhc vessel be hostile, neu-
tral, or of the nationality placing the mines. From the 
time "'"hen these 1nines arc placed, the force placing them 
has no control over them except the negative control due 
to the kno"~ledge of their supposed location. Currents 
may change according to circun1stances the location of the 
mines. The storn1s and tides of so1ne regions make it 
difficult to maintain the position of 1nines. These mines 
also sometimes drift from their moorings. In storm, fog, 
or stress of "\veather such mines 1nay be particularly dan-
gerous, because the usual precautionary measures n1ay 
be impossible, and vessels 1nay enter a n1inc field inad-
vertently. \ifhen once adrift, a contact mine 1nay re-
main a menace to shipping unless so constructed as to be-
con1c harmless on breaking adrift. 
It is open to question 'Yhether anchored contact mines 
are not so dangerous as to involve undue risk to all par-
ties 'vho use the sea. 
There is a general agreement upon the requirement 
that anchored contact mines should become harmless 
on getting adrift. 
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British instructions, 1907.-Th(\ delegates of Great 
Britain 'vere acting in accordance 'vith their instructions 
in advocating the entire abolition of the use of automatic 
contact mines. These instruet.ions 'vere as follo,vs: 
His ~Iajesty's GoYernment wo1.1ld viPw with ~atisfaction the aban-
donnlent of the employment of automatic mines in naval warfare 
altogether. Failing the acceptance of such a total prohibition. they 
earnestly hope that the employment of these engines of war will only 
be sanctioned under the strictest limitations. They would adyocate 
an arrangement by which the u~e of automatic mines should be limited 
to territorial waters, and, if possible. to such portions of territorial 
"~aters as adjoin naval bases or fortified ports. All mines thus employed 
should be effectively anchored. and so constructed that. in the eYent 
of their breaking adrift, they would c·ither automatically become harm-
less or sink, and that in any case their actiY(' life should not exceed a 
limited period of, say, six n1onths. (Correspondence Respecting the 
Second Peace Conference, Parliamentary Papers )lise. Xo. 1 (1908) 
(Cd., 3857).) 
Discussion at The Hague. 1907.-1"he discussion of the 
subject of submarine mines at The Hague in 1907 sho,ved 
that the conference considered it too early to give any 
definite pronounce1nent upon the matter. The report of 
the committee frankly achnits this. The votes in the 
subcon1mittees 'vere so1netin1es quite evenly divided. 
Several States n1aintained that the use of n1ines should 
not be prohibited not 1nerely because mines 'vould be 
needed in time of 'var. but also because they "rou1d be 
used to protect neutrality. The Brazilian delegate 
supported this position. 
The Nether lands delegate objected to the British pro-
posal on the ground that it lacked any provision relating 
to the laying of mines during a 'var by neutral po,vers 
in their territorial 'vaters in order to maintain their neu-
trality. (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Pai..x, 
Tome III, p. 521.) Other States ordinarily neutral also 
supported the proposition to allo'v the use of submarine 
m1nes. 
The general argument 'vas that belligerents 'vere not 
yet prepared to renounce the use of a means of offensive 
and defensive 'varfare 'vhich 'vas regarded as formidable 
and at the same time less costly than many other 1neans. 
'fhe States 'vith smaller navies 'vere particularly averse 
to the prohibition of mines. The general sentiment 'vas 
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favorable to regulation but not to prohibition of the use 
of mines. Germany 1naintained a position less favorable 
to regulation than most States. Great Britain led the 
movement for restriction. At the time of the adoption 
of the convention relating to mines Sir Ernest Satow 
made a formal statement on behalf of the British delega-
tion, of "rhich a translation appeared in the London 
Times of October, 1907: 
Having voted for the mines convention which the conference has 
just accepted, the British delegation desires to declare that it can not 
regard this arrangement as furnishing a final solution of the question, 
but only as marking a stage in international legislation on the subject. 
It does not consider that adequate account has been taken in the con-
vention of the rights of neutrals to protection or of hu~anitarian sen-
timents which can not be neglected. The British delegation has done 
its best to bring the conference to share its views, but its efforts in this 
direction have remained without result. The high seas, gentlemen, 
form a great international highway. If in the present. state of interna-
tional laws and customs belligerents are permitted to fight out their 
quarrels upon the high seas, it is none the less incumbent upon them 
to do nothing which might, long after their departure from a particular 
place, render this highway dangerous for neutrals who are equally 
entitled to use it. \Ve declare without hesitation that the right of the 
neutral to security of navigation on the high seas ought to come before 
the transitory right of the belligerent to employ these seas as the scene 
of the operations of war. 
Nevertheless, the convention as adopted imposes upon the bel-
ligerent no restriction as to the placing of anchored mines: which con-
sequently may be laid wherever the belligerent chooses, in his own 
waters for self-defense, in the waters of the enemy as a means of attack, 
or finally on the high seas, so that neutral navigation will inevitably 
run great risks in time of naval war and may be exposed to many a 
disaster. \Ve have already on several occasions insisted upon the 
danger of a situation of this kind. \Ve have endeavored to show what 
would be the effect produced by the loss of a great liner belonging to a 
neutral power. \Ve did not fail to bring forward every argument in 
favor of limiting the field of action for these mines, while we called 
very special attention to the advantages which the civilized world 
would gain from this restriction, since it would be equivalent to dimin-
ishing to a certain extent the causes of warlike conflicts. It appeared 
to us that by acceptance of the proposal made by us at the beginning 
of the discussion dangers would have been obviated which in every 
maritime war of the future will threaten to disturb friendly relations 
between neutrals and belligerents. But since the conference has not 
shared our views it remains for us to decl~re in the most formal manner 
that these dangers exist, and that the certainty that they will make 
themselves felt in the future is due to the incomplete character of the 
present convention. 
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As this convention , in our opinion, constitutes only a partial and 
inadequate solution of the problem, it can not, as has already been 
pointed out, be regarded as a complete exposition of international law 
on this subject. Accordingly, it will not be permissible to presume the 
legitimacy of an action for the mere reason that this convention has not 
prohibited it. This is a principle wh_ich we desired to affirm, and which 
it will be impossible for any State to ignore, whatever its power. (See 
Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome I, p. 281.) 
'rhere also appeared in the Times a translation of the 
declaration of Baron nfarschall YOll Bieberstein, of the 
Gern1an delegation, made in11nedia tely after the English 
s ta temen t, as f o llo\vs : 
That a belligerent who lays mines assun1es a very heavy responsi-
bility toward neutrals and toward peaceful shipping is a point on which 
we are all agreed. No one ''ill resort to this instrument of warfare 
unless for rnilitary reasons of an absolutely urgent character. But 
military acts are not solely governed by stipulations of int9rnational 
law. There are other factors. Conscience, good sense, and the sense 
of duty imposed by principles of humanity wiU be the surest guides for 
the conduct of sailors, and will constitute the most effective guaranty 
against abuses. The officers of the German Navy, I loudly proclaim it 
(je le dis a haute voix), will always fulfill in the strictest fashion the 
duties which en1anate from the unwritten law of humanity and civiliza-
tion. I have no need to tell you that I entirely recognize the impor-
tance of the codification of rules to be followed in war. But it would 
be a great n1istake to issue rules the strict obsen·ation of which might 
be rendered impossible by the law of facts. It is of the first hnportance 
that the international rnaritime law which we desire to create should 
only contain clauses the execution of which is possible from a military 
point of view-is possible even in exceptional circumstances. Other-
wise the respect for law would be lessened and its authority under-
mined. It would also seem to us to be preferable to maintain at present 
a certain reserve, in the expectation that seven years hence it will be 
easier to find a solution which will be acceptable to the \Vhole \Vorld. 
As to the humanitarian sentiments of which the British delegate has 
spoken, I can not admit that there is any country in the world which 
is superior to rny country or my Government in the sentiment of 
humanity. (Ibid.) 
"Tith such diversity of opinion among large States the 
prohibition of mines is not immediately possible. 
'fhe action of States since the Hague Conference of 
1907 has sho\vn that mines \Vere not to be immediately 
set aside as engines of \Var. Opinion and usage, there-
fore, seern at present unfavorable to the entire prohibi-
tion of the use of submarine mines. 
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Opinion of Dupuis.-After speaking of the discussion 
at The Hague in 1907, Prof. Charles Dupuis, "Titing in 
1911, says: 
II semble que ces constatations devTaient suffire pour faire condamner, 
meme en dehors de tout accord conventionnel, l'usage d'enging aussi 
dangereux pour la navigation pacifique que pour les vaisseaux de 
guerre belligerants. Parce que la haute 1ner n'est soumise a aucune 
souverainete, il est loisible aux belligerants de s'y battre; il est admis 
que les batiments neutres qui se risquent sur le theatre des operations 
le font a leurs risques et perils; ces batiments pourraient se tenir a 
l'ecart ou fuir a }'approche des navires de combat; s'ils ne le font pas, 
ils s'exposent sciemment a un danger qu'ils pourraient eviter; ils ne 
peuvent se plaindre des effets de leur propre imprudence. ::\Iais si, de 
ce que lamer n'est a personne, il resulte que les belligerants ont liberte 
de s'y battre, il resulte aussi que les neutres, que les pacifiques ont 
liberte de s'y n1ouvoir et droit d'user de cette liberte sans courir des 
perils qu'ils ne peuvent ni prevoir, ni eviter. II est possible de pre-
voir et d'eviter le theatre d'un con1bat; il est impossible de prevoir et 
d'eviter les mines invisibles qui fl.ottent a la derive, a des distances 
incalculables des operations de guerre, et qui conservent leur puissance 
de destruction pendant des mois et des annees apres le jour ou elles 
ont ete immergees. II est done inadmissible que les belligerants 
menacent et detruisent la liberte de la mer, en semant des engins 
aveugles et inevitables, qui portent au loin, pour un temps illi1nite, 
contre tousles navires, les perils qu'ils n'ont le droit de susciter que 
contre leurs seuls ennen1is. 
On pourrait, sans cloute, adn1ettre que les eaux territoriales des 
belligerants fussent, pendant la guerre, rendues inaccessibles par de3 
mines, a la condition que les neutres, prevenus du danger, a'ient la 
faculte de s'y soustraire, Inais encore fauclrait-il que les mines immer-
gees dans les eaux territoriales fussent mises dans l'impossibilite d'aller, 
en pleine mer, repandre le peril qu'elles ne doivent creer que dans la 
zone soumise a la juridiction des Etats riverains. (Le Droit de la 
Guerre :Maritime, No. 332, p. 547 .) 
A.s a general principle, mines may be used 'vhen under 
control or '\Tithin an area under the exclusive control of 
the belligerent "-ithin "-hich peaceful shipping may not 
enter. Therefore, mines may be used w-ithin the area of 
and during actual belligerent action, as peaceful shipping 
is excluded from this area or enters it at the risk of injury. 
Oonclusion.-The use of submarine mines should not be 
absolutely prohibited. 
Unanchored mines.-The Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-5 caused many complaints upon the use of n1ines. 
The Chinese contended that their nationals had been 
sacrificed by the careless use of 1nines by the bellig-
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crents . It \Vas tnaintaincd that the sea~ had been 
strc"'n w·ith floating 1nincs. ''Thether there \\'as any 
justification for this supposition 1nay be doubted and the 
injury to innocent vessels Inay have been caused alto-
gether by 1nincs 'vhic h had broken adrift from their 
moorings. If this \\'as the case, these mines 'verc evi-
dently not so constructed as to beco1ne harmless "'hen 
getting free of their 1noorings, for they became in effect 
floating contact 1nincs 'vhich " 'ere carried by the c·urrcnts 
in n1any directions. 
The 1nine being in any case a particularly dangerous 
engine because hidden, beco1nes even Inore dangerous 
"?hen floating freely, the kno\\'ledge of its location being 
unkno,vn and its effective life .indcfinite in duration. The 
unrestrained usc of ~nanchorecl mines is therefore gener-
ally conde1nncd as securing to the belligerent no advantage 
conunensuratc "·ith the risk involved. 
The question then arises as to the use of unanchored 
contact 1nines for special purposes. A vessel Inay be 
pur:3ucd by another. It 1nay fire a shell or discharge a 
torpedo at the pursuing vessel. 11ay it not then drop a 
n1inc in the path of the pursuer 1 Evidently the prin-
ciple is nearly the san1c as to the different 1neasures so far 
~s concerns the t"·o belligerents. The shell 'vill if it 
1nisscs its 1nark sink to the botto1n of the sea and 1nay 
becon1e i1n1nediately har1nlcss. The torpedo 'vill also 
usually becon1c harn1less 'vhen it has completed its rela-
tive! v- short run. The essential difference in the mine is 
that unless specially constructed it may rc1nain a danger 
to any vessel for an indefinite period. 'J:'he K a val ,,~ ar 
College in 1905 therefore proposed the follo,ving: 
Unanchored contact mines are prohibited, except tho"e that by con-
struction are rendered innocuous after a limited time, certainly before 
passing outside the area of itnmediate belliegrent operations. (Inter-
national Law Topics~ 1905, p. 147 .) 
The Hague Conference of 1907 adopted a son1e,vhat 
different for1nula, 1naking the tin1e of effectivity definite, 
saying it is _forbidden-
to lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are so 
constructed as to become harml~s one hour at most after the person who 
laid them ceases to control them. 
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It n1ay be observed that this fixing of one hour as the 
time of active life of an unanchored automatic contact 
mine 1nay permit the 1nine to pass entirely outside the 
area of immediate operations. If the operations should be 
in or near an ocean high,vay of commerce, the period of 
one hour as the life of an unanchored mine might be long 
enough to place 1nany neutral vessels in danger. The 
belligerent vessel 'vhich had thro,vn over the 1nine at the 
beginning of the hour might be many miles distant before 
the end of the hour, and if a vessel or fleet 'vere pursuing 
the same might be true of the pursuers. 
From the drafting of the present rule also there is no 
reason "rhy unanchored auto1natic contact mines n1ight not 
be used even "\vhen the object 1night not be to escape pur-
suit, but to endanger an enemy "Tho 'vas expected later to 
pass through the area. The only restriction is that the 
mine shall become harn1less after one hour at most, other-
"rise there is no formallitnitation, even the requiren1ent 
(art. 3) that" every possible precaution must be taken for 
the security of peaceful shipping" is applied specifically 
to "anchored automatic contact n1ines." The Hague 
regulation in regard to unanchored mines is Inanifestly 
unsatisfactory, and if unanchored mines are not altogether 
prohibited this clause should be revised. 
Attitude of United State~ at The !!ague, 1907 .-The 
United States at The Hague in 1907 proposed the pro-
hibition of unanchored n1ines. The course of discussion 
is showrn in the report of the conunittee: 
Pourtant, la proposition d'une interdiction absolue de toute mine 
automatique de contact non amarree fut reprise par la Delegation des 
Etats-Unis d' Amerique (annexe 17). Ellene put rallier la majorite des 
voix dans le comite d'examen, qui la rejeta par 11 voix contre 4 et 2 
abstentions et se prononc;a ensuite unanimement en faveur de la limi-
tation, dans le sens sus-indique, du temps pendant lequella mine non 
amaree serait dangereuse. ~lais, bien que d'accord sur ce dernier 
principe, les membres du comite n'etaient pas unanimes a vouloir aussi 
fixer d'une maniere determinee le laps de temps dans lequelles n1ines 
non-amarrees devraient devenir inoffensives. On a soutenu qu'il y a 
des cas ou une limitation fixee d'avance est impossible; on devrait se 
contenter d'une formule plus generale qui statuerait, sans fixer un laps 
de temps "que les mines automatiques de contact non amarrees doivent 
devenir inoffensives a pres un temps limite de maniere a n'offrir aucun 
danger aux navires neutres." "Si une force navale," a dit le Contre-
713Q6-Hi--8* 
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Amiral Siegel, " se voit poursuivie et veut lancer des mines non amar-
n3es pour empecher son adversaire de l'atteindre, une limite deter-
mince, avant tout la limite d'une heure, rendrait l'emploi de cette 
anne tres souvent inefficace et inutile, 6tant donne que celui qui pour-
suit sera en mesure, soit par ses eclaireurs, soit par d'autres moyens, 
de connaltre que son adversau·e a jete des mines; ce dernier trouverait 
done des moyens pour eviter tout danger, SOit en faisant un petit detour, 
soit en attendant une heure avant de passer sur le lieu dangereux, apres 
quoi il sera en toute securite. Un autre cas se presente, si un ennemi 
bloque !'embouchure d'un fleuve. Si le defenseur vent employer des 
mines flottant~s contre son ennemi en les envoyant en aval, le temps de 
leur efficacite doit etre en rapport avec la longueur du chemin a par-
courir et ne peut pas etre fixe d'avance." 
Malgrc ces considerations, la n1ajorite du comite, desirant assurer 
une efficacite reelle au principe adopte, se pronon9a en faveur d'une 
limite de temps fixee d'avance (9 voix contre 2 et 5 abstentions), apres 
quoi le comitc, appele a choisu· entre la limite d'une heure et celle de 
deux heures (la derniere proposee a titre transactionnel parS. Exc. ~I. 
de Hammarskjold) se pronon9a en faveur de la limite d'une heure, ala 
majorite de 8 voix, contre 1 et 7 abstentions.'.' (Deuxieme Conference 
Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 403.) 
Precautions as to unanchored 'inines .-If 1nines are to 
be used they are evidently engines of such nature as 
should be used \\'"ith son1e care that they do no injury to 
parties not concerned in the \\'"ar . 
.. A ..11 innocent private vessel of the enen1y 1nay not be 
sunk unless under "exceptional necessity," and those on 
board n1ust be placed in safety before the destruction of 
the vessel, though \vhen such a vessel deliberately con1es 
\vithin range in time of actual battle, it must take the 
consequences. The existence of an actual battle is a 
fact evident to the vessel. 
Thi::, condition is some\vhat parallel to that of a float-
ing unanchored 1nine thro\\'"n over by one belligerent ves-
sel \Vhile another is pursuing. It y,'"ould see1n that to 
make the situation n1ore nearly parallel the range of the 
n1ine should be that of a shell or of a torpedo or the actual 
limit of in1n1ecliate operations. .1\..t the present ti1ne it is 
probable that the guns of any ship of \\'"ar have not a range 
greater than the distance \\'"hich could be n1ade by a fast 
vessel in one-half hour. One hour \Vould therefore seem 
a long life to allo\v to unanchored contact mines, because 
if not exploded they 1night continue for a half hour to 
be a danger to innocent shipping \vhich 1night presu1ne 
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the sea to be safe after the pursued and pursuer had 
passed. If a long life is allo,ved to unanchored mines 
there is the correspondingly increased risk that these 
mines may drift .in unexpected directions and to a greater 
distance from the point of launching. If allo\ved a life of 
one hour the vessel n1ay be before the end of the hour 
beyond the distance \vithin \vhich an approaching neutral 
or other innocent vessel can he notified of ·the danger 
fron1 the mine. 
The use of uncontrolled, unanchored contact n1ines 
should be prohibited. The reasons for prohibiting un-
anchored, uncontrolled mines are Inany. Among the 
reasons \vould be the extretne danger to all "Tho follo\V 
the sea as compared "Tith the slight chance that the 
enemy against \vhom the 1nine is launched \vill be injured. 
These mines should be clearly distinguished from the 
controlled, unanchored contact mines, the range of action 
of \Vhich is determined by the belligerent \Vho launched 
the n1ine. 
A belligerent at the present time has no right to com-
plain of the use of 1nines against his vessels of \\rar. It is 
true that the 1nine is a hidden 1neans of attack, but the 
submarine boat n1ay also be a hidden means of attack, 
and there is no prohibition of the use of hidden or secret 
measures provided no perfidy is involved. The innocent 
vessels of the enen1y are generally exempt from attack 
though they may be taken as prize. Small coast fishing 
vessels and small boats engaged in local trade are, \vhen 
innocently employed, by convention, exen1pt fron1 cap-
ture even. The obligation of the belligerent to guard 
such vessels against injury from mines w'ould therefore 
be as imperative as to guard them against injury from 
cannon fire. The only \vay in \vhich this can be done is 
by control of the life of the mine. 
As a life of one hour seems an unduly long titne for an 
uncontrolled, unanchored n1ine and involves undue risks, 
it \vould see1n best to further limit the maximum time, 
and as in 1nany cases the maximum tin1e should not be 
granted, there should be another basis for cleter1nination 
of the life depending upon the area of in11nedia te hostili-
ties. A co1nbina tion of these \vould seen1 to give the 
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necess~ry nnd reasonable guaranty for safety of innocent 
\esse ls, particularly '"hen an cngagen1cn t 1nigh t take 
plnce in tho neighborhood of the high,vays of 1naritiine 
conunerce, as 1nay be the case. The proposition of the 
Naval \Vnr College in 1905 w·as that-
Unanchcr~d, contact mines arc prohibited except those that by 
construction are rendered innocuous after a limited time, certajnly 
before passing outside the area of in1me<li.ate belligerent activities. 
The I-I ague convention of 1907 provided that it is for-
bidden-
to lay unanchored automatic contact mines. except when they are so 
constructed as to become harmless 11ne hour at most after those who 
laid them haYe lost control nf. them. 
It may be advantageous to combine these propositions, 
as the single limit of time proposed at The I-Iague does 
not seem to be sufficient. The \~V ar College proposition 
of 1905 contained a reference to time "\vhich "\vas not made 
specific. There "\vould probably be a little objection to 
making the time limit specific provided it "\vere not too 
long. One hour seems too long. One-half hour seems 
ample from a belligerent point of view, and from the neu-
tral point of view the shorter the time the more satis-
factory, because the risk "\Vould be correspondingly 
lessened. 
Gonclusion.-The use of unanchored automatic contact 
mines should be prohibited or more definitely restricted. 
Using the phraseology of the Hague convention and intro-
ducing the proposed changes, the follo,ving form may be 
suggested as meeting present requirements and opinions: 
It is forbidden to lay unanchored automatic contact 
mines except "\vhen they are so constructed as to become 
harmless one-half hour after those "\vho laid them have 
lost control over them, and in every case before passing 
outside the area of belligerent activities. 
General statement as to area.-It is generally admitted 
that one belligerent must at all times when outside of 
neutral jurisdiction be on guard against attack "\vhich 
may legitimately be made by the other belligerent. 
This attack may be made upon the high sea8 or "\vithin 
belligerent "\Vaters. The attack may be sudden under 
cover of night, of fog, or of ruse not involving perfidy. 
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When a neutral vessel enters the area of actual legiti-
mate hostilities the vessel enters at its o'vn risk. If the 
opposing belligerents are engaged in firing upon each other 
a neutral vessel comes 'vithin range at its peril. Certain 
areas in the neighborhood of fortifications or other points 
of military importance are sometimes set apart as strate-
gic areas and vessels are notified or 'varned not to enter. 
Such action has been generally approved. Blockaded 
areas are universally recognized as closed to free com-
munication. Blockaded and strategic areas are exam-
ples of areas from which the innocent vessel is 'varned by 
public proclamation or notification. The liability of the 
neutral is based upon his action 'vhen kno,vledge of con-
ditions based on proclamation or notification may be 
presumed. In case of an actual battle, knowledge is pre-
sumed because of the evident facts. It is proper that a 
neutral should bear the consequences of disregard of 
knowledge which he reasonably may be presumed to have. 
The risk from mines is or may be such as can not be 
presumed to be kno,vn to the innocent vessel. In case 
of bombardment the commander of the attacking force 
is under obligation to do his utmost to 'varn the authori-
ties. Other provisions are in the direction of safeguard-
ing not only neutrals but also noncombatants. ~1any 
regulations are aimed to safeguard those not engaged in 
warfare from hidden dangers. 
The right of innocent use of the high sea has long been 
recognized as paramount to any right of a belligerent to 
exclude innocent vessels from a given area, except for 
immediate military reasons. Even a blockade to be 
binding 1nust be effective. It is, of course, possible that 
a battle n1ay be 'vaged in any part of the high sea; this 
contingency does not, ho,vever, give a belligerent the 
right to exclude innocent shipping fron1 any area in 
'vhich he is not actually operating or maintaining a force. 
A belligerent has the right to place 1nines in certain 
areas for military purposes. These military purposes 
are supposed to be immediate and not remote or con-· 
tingent. The propriety of placing of .mines for the 
defense of a n1ilitary port is 'videly adn1itted, though 
there is difference of opinion upon the distance from the 
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port at 'vhich n1ines 1nay be laid. The laying of mines 
in the high sea is not adn1itted by aU to be allowable, 
but all cleinancl proper precautions for innocent parties. 
The discussion as to n1ines in the high-sea areas sho,vs 
less accord in reference to unanchored contact n1ines than 
in reference to anchored mines. 
Speaking of the n1ines in the seas of the Far East, 
during the· Russo -Japanese "rar ('vhether they might 
haYe been anchored and have broken loose, or 'vhether 
they n1ight haYe been unanchored, the results 'vould 
haYe been the sa1ne), Prof. Westlake said: 
~ow, the right of a State in the waters subj ~ct to its sovereignty can 
certainly not rank higlv::.r than that of a private owner in the land or 
water which is his property. Still less. if possible. can the right of a 
State in the open sea, which is free to the use of all. rank higher than 
that cf prope1ty. But no principle is 1nore firmly established in the 
sclence of bw th::>..n that ''h~ch s:1ys to an O\nler sic utere tuo ut alienum 
non bedas. The right of s0vereignty, therefore, does not extend to 
emp1oying anywhere "hat may be foreseen to be engines of slaughter 
and damage to unoffending foreigners. The foreign government whose 
subjects suffer from such engines does not need to inquire whether their 
_use is prohibited by any positive rule of .international law, whether 
r~sting on recogn:.zed custmn or an agree1nent. They are indefensible 
in themselves. and the fore~gn govern1nent concerned will be justified 
not only in taking up the cause of its injured suhject~. It will not have 
exceeded its rights if it interferes in orde1 to stop the offending methods 
of war. (International Law, Part II, \Var. p. 322.) 
The contention of Prof. Westlake that the right of 
sovereignty does not extend to unregulated employ1nent 
of mines is so generally supported at the present tin1e as 
to scarcely need discussion. It may therefore be stated 
in a general 'vay that mines may not be used except 
within certain defined areas. What these areas shall be 
is, ho,vever, a question upon w·hich there still exists 
differences of opinion. 
Propositions as to area, The Hague, 1907.-The British 
proposition at the Second Hague Conference, 1907, in 
article 4 limited the use of automatic contact subn1arine 
mines to the territorial 'vaters of the belligerents and to an 
area extending 10 1niles from fortified places or military 
ports. 
The X etherlands delegation 'vould also prevent the 
mining of straits 'vhich unite open seas. (Deuxieme 
Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 661.) 
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The Spanish delegation 'vished to limit the placing of 
mines by one belligerent in the territorial 'vaters of the 
other belligerent· to the area over 'Yhich the belligerent 
placing the mines 'vas in effective control. 
-Germany added an important suggestion: 
La pose des mines automatiques de contact sera aussi permise sur 1e 
theatre de laguerre; sera considere comme theatre de laguerre l'espace 
de mer sur lequel se fait ou vient de se faire une operation de guerre ou 
sur lequel une pareille operation pourra avoir lieu par suite de la 
presence ou de !'approche des forces armees des deux belligerants 
(Ibid., p. 663.) 
Later a somewhat modified suggestion 'vas made by 
the German delegation: 
La pose des mines automatiques de contact amarrees sera aussi 
permise dans !'emplacement de l'activite immediate des belligerants, 
pourvu que les precautions soient prises pour la surete a laquelle les 
neutres ont droit. (Ibid., p. 668.) 
A somewhat similar amendment was offered by the 
Nether lands delegation. 
The various propositions were put in definite form as 
basis for consideration by the comite d'examen, as fol-
lo,vs: 
ARTICLE 2. Il est interdit de placer des n1ines automatiques de 
contact amarrees de la d'une distance de trois milles marins a partir de 
la laisse de basse mer, ou le long de toute l'etendue des cotes, ainsi que 
des lies et des banes qui en dependent. 
Pour les baies, le rayon de trois milles marins sera mesure a partir 
d'une ligne droite, tiree en travers de la baie dans la partie la plus 
rapprochee de l'entree au premier point ou l'ouverture n' excedera pas 
dix milles. 
ART. 3. Devant les ports de guerre, la limite pour le placement des 
mines est portee a une distance de dix milles marins. 
Sont consideres comme ports de guerre les ports, qui sont decretes 
comme tels par l'Etat auquel ils appartiennent et ceux oil existent des 
chantiers navals de construction. 
ART. 4. Dans les limites indiquees aux deux articles precedents, lea 
belligerants ont le droit de placer des mines automatiques de contact 
amarrees dans les eaux de leurs adversaires. 
Toutefois il est interdit d'y placer des mines automatiques de contact 
dans le seul but d'intercepter la navigation de cominerce. 
ART. 5. Dans la sphere de leur activite immediate, les belligerants 
ont de meme le droit de placer des mines automatiques de contact en 
dehors des limites fixees par les articles 2-4 du present reglement. 
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Les mines employees en _dehors des limites fixees par les article 2-4 
doivent etre construites de fa~on qu'elles soient rendues inoffensives 
dans un delai maximum de deux heures apres que le poseur les a 
abandonnees. 
ART. 6 (reserve). La communication entre deux mers libres ne peut 
etre barree entierement par des mines automatiques de contact. l\fais 
le passage pourra y etre soumis a des conditions qui seront decretees par 
les autorites competentes. 
La disposition de l'alinea 1er ne porte aucune atteinte aux regles 
etablies par les traites et conYentions existants, ni aux droits de la 
souverainete territoriale. (Ibid., p. 671.) 
With tho exception of n.rticle 6 above the projet 
presented to the third committee closely resembled that 
before the comite d'examen. 
Later the Colombian delegation proposed to make 
certain changes and to introduce as article 2-
L'emploi des mines automatiques de contact amarrees est absolument 
interdit excepte comme moyen de defense. 
Les belligerantes ne pourront se servir desdites mines que pour la 
protection de leurs propres cotes et seulement jusqu'a la distance de la 
portee maxime des canons. 
Dans le cas des bras de mer ou des passages maritimes navigables 
conduisant exclusivement aux cotes d'une seule Puissance, cette 
Puissance pourra barrer leur entree, pour sa protection, en pla~ant des 
mines automatiques de contact amarrees. 
Il est absolument interdit aux belligerants de placer des mines 
automatiques de contact amarrees en pleine mer ou dans les eaux de 
l'ennemi. (Ibid., p. 680.) 
Circumstances determining use of mines .-Some consid-
eration must be given to the purposes for which mines are 
used. "\Vhile there are those who \vould prohibit the use 
of minos altogether, these do not seem to be in the 
majority at the present tin1o. Admitting that mines will 
for a ti1ne continue to be used, their use may be limited 
30 that circumstances \voulcl condition the legality. 
Mines may be prohibited except for purposes of defense. 
There ahvays arises in such a case a difference of opinion 
upon \Vhat constitutes defense, and it is not ahvays 
possible to determine \vhother mines in a given region 
are placed for defense or offense. This difference of 
opinion appeared at the conference at The IIague in 
1907. 1fany States in favor of limiting the use of mines 
could not be convinced that this method of restriction 
\vould realize that end. The Colombian propc'sition that 
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the use of anchored automatic contact mines should be 
~tbsolutely prohibited except for purposes of defense \vas 
voted upon, receiving 16 affirmative and 15 negative 
votes, while 6 abstained from voting and 7 'vere absent. 
As this did not give an cybsolute ·majority, further con-
sideration of this proposition 'vas abandoned. (Ibid., 
Tome I, p. 292.) 
Another proposition was made by the Nether lands 
delegation looking to special regulation of the use of 
mines in straits. This also did not receive sufficient 
support to make it a part of the proposed convention. 
Use of mines for intercepting commerce.- It was ~efi­
nitely proposed at the Hague Conference to prohibit the 
use of mines for intercepting commerce. This proposi· 
tion was not sufficiently supported, and the question came 
upon the form of restriction. The British delegation 
proposed to allo'v mines only before such ports as are 
considered "military ports." 
The second draft of the report of the committee was as 
follows: 
It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coast and port1:: 
of the enemy with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping. 
The German delegate declared that he reserved his 
vote upon this form, as it introduced a subjective ele-
ment in the determination of the character of the act 
which in application 'vould give rise to difficulties. 
The British delegate remarked that the British propo-
sition was advanced 'vith the idea of avoiding the German 
objection. When the second draft was put to vote, 33 
voted yes, 3 abstained, 7 'vere absent, and Germany 
reserved its vote, and the convention provided that 
mines for "the sole object of intercepting com1nerical 
shipping" were prohibited. 
The recognized method ·of intercepting commerce 'vith 
n. belligerent is by blockade. The penalty for attempting 
to violate blockade may be condemnation of ship and 
cargo, but there is no penalty imposed upon the cre,v, as 
would be the case if mines were used to destroy the ship. 
Naval lVar College discussion, 1913.-The conclusions 
drawn from the discussions at the Naval v'Tar College 
in 1913 'vere in accord 'vith the general opinion of naval 
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men and of ,,.Titers. This opinion sho,vs a tendency 
to,vard n1ore definite restriction upon the use of mines, 
both as regards character of the mines and as regards 
area 'vithin 'vhich they may be placed. 'rhe subject 
"\Vas, ho,vever, considered only as one part of the general 
topic of means of injuring the enemy. The conclusion 
as to torpedoes and mines "\Vas as foUo,vs: 
Torpedoes and mines: 
(a) It is forbidden to use torpedoes which do not become harmless 
when they have completed their run. 
(b) It is forbidden to lay mines in the high seas except within the 
immediate area of belligerent operations. 
(c) It is forbidden in the htgh seas and in marginal waters of the 
belligerent (1) to lay unanchored automatic contact mines except when 
they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after 
those 'vho laid them have lost control of them; (2) to lay anchored 
automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they 
have broken loose from their moorings. 
(d) A belligerent is forbidden to lay mines off the coast or before the 
ports of the enemy except for strictly military or naYal purpoEes. 
It is forbidden to lay mines in order to establish or to maintain a 
commercial blockade. 
(e) 'Vhen mines· are employed, every possible precaution must be 
taken for the security of peaceful shipping. 
The belligerents undertake to provide as far as possible that these 
mines shall become harmless within a limited time, and should they 
cease to be under surveillance, to notify the danger zones as soon as 
military exigencies permit by a notice to mariners, which must also 
be communicated to the Governments through the diplomatic channel. 
(f) At the close of the war the belligerent States undertake to do their 
utmost to remove the mines which they have laid, each State removing 
its own mines. 
As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by one of the bei-
ligerents off the coast of the other, their position must be notified to the 
other party by the State which laid them, and each State must proceed 
with the least possible delay to remove the mines in its own waters. 
The belligerent States upon which the obligation to remove the 
mines falls after the end of the war should as soon as possible give notice 
that the m~nes have so far as possible been removed. (International 
Law Topics and Discu~sions, 1913, p. 147 .) 
Institute o.f International Law, 1910-1913.--The Naval 
War College, International La'v Topics, 1913, pages 143-
146, sho'v that "\Vith slight modification in regard to the 
provision for removal of the mines after the "\Var the rules 
6f the Institute, approved in 1910, "\Vere approved in 1913. 
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These rules of the Institute follo'v closely the Hague 
convention relative to the laying of automatic contact 
submarine mines except as to the area. The Institute 
rule provides: 
It is forbidden to lay in the open sea automatic contact mines, whether 
or not anchored. 
At earlier sessions there had been proposed the fol-
lowing: 
It is forbidden to lay fixed or floating mines in the oren sea. 
The main point upon 'vhich emphasis may be placed 
is the prohibition of mines in the open sea in distinction 
from marginal waters, and the report of 1910 shows that 
it was the intention of the Institute that this prohibition 
should be absolute. (23 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit 
International, pp. 179, 429.) 
Discussion as to area, The Hague, 1907.-'fhe qu<?stion 
as to limitation of area within 'vhirh mines might be laid 
received much discussion and the proposi tio~1s of the 
con1ite d'exan1en in respect to limitation of area were 
much reduced. 
Admiral Siegel, speaking for the German delegation, 
assumed a hypo-thetical case to illustrate the ground of 
opposition to certain restrictions: 
Aussi, la Delegation allemande doit-elle faire des reserves sur les 
articles dont les dispositions peuvent causer des malentendus et qui 
d'autre part interdiraient l'emploi des mines en beaucoup des cas, 
ou cet emploi est indispensable. II sera cite un seul exemple. Si 
une flotte X bloque la cote d'un pays Y, elle le fait pour lui couper 
toute communication par mer. Elle veut faire mourir le pays d'une 
lente inanition en le privant de ses moyens d'existence. Le pays 
y fera tout son possible pour eviter un pareil sort et cherchera a tenir 
les navires de la flotte X a une distance aussi grande que possible de 
ses rivages. Dans le cas ou les forces maritimes ne suffisent pas a 
atteindre ce but, l'Etat Y trouve dans les mines un auxiliaire pre-
cieux. Mais pour les mettre en activite, il faut les porter dans la 
proximite de l'ennemi. Or, la flotte X ne s'arretera pas toujours pres 
de la cote, elle stationnera peut-etre a une distance de 20 milles ou 
plus. Comme !'article 3 interdit l'emploi des mines a une distance 
au-dela de 3 mllles, et en quelques cas de 10 milles de la cote, le defen-
seur se verrait prive du seul moyen qui put forcer la flotte ennemie a 
s'eloigner de ces cotes. Cet etat de choses serait absolurnent inadmis-
sible. Mais ce n'est pas tout. L'article 5 interdit toutes les mines qui 
ne deviennent pas inoffensives deux heures apres qu'elles ont ete 
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abandonnees par celui qui les a posces. Si done, dans le cas men-
tionne, le defenseur y a pose des mines devant ses navires dans !'espe-
rance de pouvoir rester sur place pendant uncertain temps, et s'il est 
attaque par la ftotte X beaucoup plus forte que lui et qui !'oblige a se 
retirer precipitamment, comment serait-il en mesure de trouver les 
moyens pour garantir que les mines qu'il a posees deviennent inoffen-
sives dans les deux heures? Il est evident que c'est impossible, cet 
exemple qui teste parfaitement dans le cadre de ce qui pent arriver 
dans chaque guerre demontre jusqu'a !'evidence que les dispositions 
des articles 3 et 5 sont inacceptables au point de vue militaire. I1 
convient en outre de faire observer que dans le cas qui vient d'etre 
cite on ne saurait dire que les interets de la navigation pacifique soient 
en jeu. Entre nne cote bloquee et la ftotte bloquante aucune naviga-
tion de commerce ne pent exister. Pourquoi alors ces restrictions inac-
ceptables? (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de ]a Paix, Tome 
III, p. 378.) 
Sir Erne.st Sato,\~, of the British delegation, set forth 
the reasons "·hy the general public should be deeply 
interested in the regulation of the usc of subn1arin.c 1nines 
and .the dangers of any considcra b le freedon1 in the use 
of 1nir:.cs. In or..e part of the so1nc,vha t extended dis-
cussion t:'ir Err.cs t P a to'v renu1rks: 
N ous SOillilles d'avis que la pose de mines amarrees en dehors des 
eaux tercitoriales des belligerants et au-dela d'une limite de dix milles 
marins devant les ports de guerre, arsenaux militaires, ou etablisse-
ments de constructions navales ou de radoub, doit etre interdite aux 
belligecants. Le droit qu'accorde le projet de poser des mines amarrees 
en pleine mer dans I a ''sphere d'activite immediate donne aux bel-
ligerants la faculte de semer ces engins dans toutes les mers pen pro-
fondes. Ainsi elles pourraient etre posees dans une grande partie de 
I a Baltique, dans la :Jier du Nord, la :Jianche, sur les cotes de la :Jiedi-
terranee, pour ne pas parler du Detroit de l\Ialacca, des parages des 
Indes N eerlandaises, du Golfe du Tonkin et de la :Jier J anne. Il est 
vrai qu'il est stipule au 2e alinea de l'a1ticle 5 que les mines amar-
rees en pleine mer devront etre construites de fa~on a devenir inoffen-
sives dans un delai 1naximum de deux heures apres qu'elles auront 
ete abandonnees par le billigerant poseur, mais comment cette stipula-
tion pourra-t-elle etre mise a execution? Sauf dans le cas de la mine 
electro-mecanique, la mine nne fois posee ne pent etre rendue inoffen-
sive que par l'action d'une contre mine qui, elle, agit instantanement. 
Nons ne croyons pas que l'on puisse inventer nne mine qui devienne 
inoffensive deux heures apres que le belligerant poseur aura quitte les 
lieux, peut-etre a la hate pour echapper a la pourJuite de l'ennemi; 
la stipulation nons paralt done demander !'impossible et il nons paL·ait 
preferable de supprimer !'article 5 en entier ce qui aura pour resultat 
de faire disparaitre aussi l'alinea 2 de !'article 9. 
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L'article 4, alinea 3, declare qu'il "est interdit de placer des mines 
automatiques de contact devant les cotes et les ports de l'adversaire 
dans le seul but d'intercepter la navigation de commerce." C'est Ia 
une clause qui laisse au belligerant une echappatoire bien dangereuse. 
On avait propose dans le comite de ne permettre la pose de mines 
devant un port de commerce qu'a la condition qu'il y eut dans ce port 
au moins une grande unite de combat, mais la proposition fut vivement 
combattue et dut, par consequent, etre retiree. Cependant il serait, 
a notre avis, tout a fait contraire a I' esprit eta la lettre de la Declaration 
de Paris de permettre qu'un blocus flit maintenu, totalement ou en 
partie, a l'aide de mines. J e me permets de vous rappeler le texte 
meme du passage qui a trait a cette question: "Les blocus, pour etre 
obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force 
suffisante pour interdire reellement l'acces du littoral de l'ennemi." 
Il est clair qu'il s'agit ici d'une force suffisante composee de navires de 
guerre, et que l'on ne peut comprendre dans cette categorie des mines 
sons-marines qui ne sont sujettes a aucun contrOle et qui ne contien-
nent en elles aucune preuve evidente de !'intention de fermer acces 
du port bloque. Il serait par consequent bon de tirer ce point au clair 
afin de ne laisser subsister aucun equivoque, et c'est pourquoi nous 
avons l'honneur de proposer le texte suivant a la place de celui que 
nous avons sous les yeux: 
"Il est interdit de poser des mines automatiques de contact devant 
les ports de l'adversaire autres que ceux qui sont consideres comme 
ports de guerre." (Ibid., p. 380.) 
Gen. Porter: of the American delegation, speaking on 
the proposed convention, says of the clu.uses particularly 
relating to area in \Yhich 1nines may be placed: 
Il est evident que la determination de la limite de trois milles serait 
souvent extremement difficile sur une cote bordee d'lles et de banes 
partiellement ou totale1nent submerges, et qui peut-etre ne seraient 
meme pas releves; mais !'objection capitale a cet article est que la 
portee des canons de vaisseaux de guerre modernes etant de 15,000 
yards, la distance de trois milles ou 6,000 yards est moindre que la 
moitie de leur portee; ainsi des vaisseaux pourraien t a ttaq uer les cotes 
avec impunite malgre la defense au moyen de mines. 
Il est vrai que la superficie de la pose des mines a ete etendue par 
un vote du comite a la "sphere d'activite immediate," et tel est le 
but du l er alinea de I' article 5, mais le 2e alinea de cet article stipule 
que les mines ainsi placees en dehors de la limite de trois milles 
deviendront inoffensives deux heures apres qu'elles auront ete aban-
donnees. Il est clair que ceci est impossible, etantdonne qu'une mine 
aussi intelligel!te n'a jamais ete imaginee. Si le navire faisant la 
patrouille du champ des mines est force de rentrer par suite de !'ap-
proche de l'ennemi toute communication physique avec les mines est 
necessairement rompue, et l'ennemi se fiant ala bonne foi eta l'habi-
lete technique avec lesquelles les stipulations d'une convention ont 
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etc executees par l 'auYersaire peut prendre Une base de tir commode 
aprcs que deux heures se sont ecoulees, et proceder :\ la destruction 
de routes, ponts, viaducs, tunnels, docks et autres etablissements de 
manufactures et de constructions de navires qui se trouvent en de9a 
de trois 1nilles de ln laisse de basse-mer, malgre toute defense de 1nine. 
. , 
Evidemment les stipulations de l'article 5, alinea 2, sont prohibi-
tives, et ceci etant tacitement admis, une disposition fut introduite 
dans !'article 3, en VUe de permettre }'usage de Inines aillarreeS a dix 
milles en avant des ports de guerre, Yraisemblablement deja forte-
ment fortifies, disposition qui ne subit aucune restriction par le 2e 
paragraphe de !'article 5, tanclis que, par contre, le 1neme droit est refuse 
a des ports sans defense. Il est vrai que le 2e alinea de l'article 3 
permet pratiquement de declarer tout port, port de guerre, mais le 
droit legitime de defense ne devrait pas etre subordonne a !'interpre-
tation d'une stipulation intentionnellement vague. 
L'article 3 permet ala defense de placer des mines jusqu':\ la limite 
de 10 milles devant tout port que l'on peut declarer port de guerre. 
L'article 4, alinea 2, permet seulement a la force attaquante de placer 
des mines en dehors de la limite de trois nlilles a partir de la laisse de 
basse-mer de la cote de son adversaire, quand les etablissements de 
construction de navires ou autres sont la propriete de l'Etat; inegalite 
qui a ete proposee ala session de l'Institut de Droit International et 
rejetee, ainsi que cela est signale dans le rapport tres competent actuelle-
ment soumis ala commission. 
Les articles 2 et 3 ne sont pas acceptes par la Delegation des Etats-
Unis. Ils portent une atteinte serieuse aux droits existants et neces-
saires a la defense; ils sont Yagues et complexes au point de constituer 
une menace de serieux malentendus s'ils etaient acceptes. 
Les l er et 2e alineas de I' article. 4 ne sont pas acceptes par nous 
en raison de l'inegalite de leurs dispositions et aussi de !'incertitude 
de leur application. (Ibid., p. 386.) 
.A .. dn1iral Sperry, also of the An1erican delegation, had 
said in the co1nite d'exa.n1en: 
L'omission, dans la proposition de la Delegation des Etats-Unis 
d' Amerique relativement aux mines sous-marines, d'une limitation 
definie des emplacements dans lesquels elles peuvent ctre placees, 
n'est pas due a une sympathie quelconque pour l'usage general 
des mines au-dela des eaux territoriales, methode que, en commun 
avec tout le monde civilise, elle condamne, mais bien a d'autres con-
siderations (annexe 17). 
Le terme "eaux territoriales" n' est peut-etre pas plus certain dans 
son application que les limites mesurees; mais le delegue naval des 
Etats-Unis n'est pas prepare a dire qu'une limitation d 'une maniere 
ou d'une autre ne porterait pas atteinte au droit de defendre les 4,000 
milles de la cote continentale des Etats-Unis, a certains points qui 
doivent etre approches par un chenal tortueux entre des recifs sub-
merges, loin du rivage, oil quelques 1nines empecheraient absolument 
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rl'a\·oir acces. Dans une ile, enYironnee de nkifs, des Philippines, il 
y a une grande baie entouree de tous cotes par la terre , qui abriterait 
la flotte de la plus grande Puissance. 
Les Puissances, qui sont representees ici, ont de vaates et riehes 
possessions dans l'Ocean Pacifique et l'Ocean Indien, ou les ports et 
les iles sont abrites par des barrierres de recifs de corail, avec seulement 
ici et la un passage qui peut etre ou non en dec;a de dix, ou en de~a 
de cent milles de la terre ferme. 
Les recifs peuYent etre decouYerts ou non a man~e basse. Ou est 
la limite de la man~e basse? A-t-il ete decide que toutes les eaux en-
dedans de recifs sont des eaux territoriales? Les trois milles seront-ils 
mesures des recifs et au-dela? La cote (Lasteric) d' Australie est 
abritee pendant plus de mille milles par le Grand Bane de Recifs a 
une distance de vingt a cent cinquante milles du riYage. En dedans 
de ce recif, ou il n'y a que de loin en loin des passages, il existe un 
labyrinthe de recifs moindres et d'llots, mais dans les mille milles les 
plus gros vaisseaux peuvent naviguer en surete SOliS la charge d'un 
pilote. II n'est pas necessaire pour un navire n'allant pas a un port 
australien de passer en dedans, et les eaux interieures ne peuvent 
guere etre consiclerees comme faisant partie de Ia haute mer. II n'est 
pas a la connaissance du Delegue des Etats-Unis si elles sont con-
siderees ainsi; mais il semble douteux que les nationaux de cette 
grande et riche communaute abandonnent volontiers ce qui serait 
presqu'une defense parfaite des points importants. 
II y a beaucoup de Puissances representees ici, dont les cotes de 
leurs vastes empires coloniaux sont protegees par des rem parts presque 
parfaits de corail, comme tous les officiers de marine le saYent, et il 
serait bon de considerer avec soin les effets qui pourraient resulter de 
toute proYision conventionnelle, sur laquelle nous pourrions nous 
mettre d'accord, et qui une fois faite, sera difficile a denoncer. (Ibid., 
p. 408.) 
When the article3 of the proposed convention relating 
to areas in \vhich n1ine.~ might be placecl 'vere brought 
before the full committee, opinion 'vas not sufficiently 
favor~ble to 'varrant presenting articles 2-5 of the report 
of the comite d'exa.n1en to the full conference. The 
suppre3sion of these articles necessarily led to certain 
an1endnlents in articles 'vhich "rere related. 
The suppres;;ion of reference to the limitation of area 
'\Tithin 'vhich mines might be used 'vas not regarded as 
giving an unlin1ited right to belligerent or to neutral to 
use 1nines inrliscriminately in any area. It \vaa recog-
nized that n very heavy responsibility restednpon the one 
'vho placed a mine to see that. it did not injure neutrals. 
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The area of the use of mines \Vas hroadly left to '' t,he 
conscience, the good sense: and the consciousness of 
the oblig~1tions irnposed by the principles of huntanity.·'' 
(Ibid., Ton1e I, p. 2S9.) 
Conclusion.-Fron1 the discussion there \vas evident 
'videly divergent opinion as to the proper regulations jn 
regard to area. Front the votes there 'vas no decisive 
conclusion. \r-hae 1uuch can be left to the sense of interna-
tional obligution, it w·ould seem tha.t certain general rules 
might be estu blished without unduly impairing the rights 
of innocent parties \Yhile securing reasonable freerlorn of 
action for belligereu ts. 
Removal o..f mi-nes.-As belligerents may not only place 
mines within their o'vn 'vaters and on the high seas, but 
also 'vithin the 'vaters of one another under present regu-
lations, it is necessary that some provision be n1ade for 
the ren1oval of the mines at the close of the 'va.r. N atu-
rally also a state 'vould not desire that a foreign vessel 
should enter its 'vaters for the purpose of ren1oving mines 
even in tirne of peace. Of course, there n1ay be, as the 
delegate of the United States pointed out, con1plications 
and difficulties in the removal of mines. Though the 
part~y 'vho placed the mines is under obligation to notify 
the other of the situation of the mines, the difficulties of 
exact statement of these facts n1ay be great, mines may 
have drifted, or n1ay have broken loose so that it is 
impossible to give accurate information. The placing of 
mines off an enemy coast 'vould usually be undertaken at 
considerable risk, 'vould usually be hastily performed, 
and accurate locations 'vould be correspondingly lacking. 
The mines laid by a state within its o'vn 'vaters 'vould 
naturally be ren1oved by that state, but it may be 'veil 
for the safety of navigation in general. that this_ removal 
be made obligatory. 
The mines laid in the high seas, if this practice is 
allowed, might constitute the greatest danger. The 
difficulty in picking up these mines would be great. 
Article 5 of the Hague convention relative to the lay-
ing of automatic contact submarine mines seems to be 
generally approved, though it may be questioned 'vhethPr 
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it will accomplish in fact "\vhat is hoped. The article 1s 
as foUo,vs: 
At the close of the war, the contracting powers undertake to do 
their utmost to remove the mines which they have laid, each power 
removing its own mines. 
As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by one of the 
belligerents off the coast of the other, their position must be notified to 
the other party by the power which laid them, and each power must 
proceed with the least possible delay to remove the mines in its own 
waters. 
Precautions as to anchored mines.-The Naval War 
College discussion in 1905 and the discussion at The 
Hague in 1907 as well as the discussion of the Institute 
of International I_jaw through several years, show agree-
ment upon the point that anchored contact mines should 
be so constructed as to become harmless "\Vhen breaking 
adrift. 
Article 3 of The Hague Convention of 1907 is: 
\Vhen anchored automatic contact mines are employed, every pos-
sible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping. 
The belligerents undertake to provide as far as possible that these 
mines shall become harmless within a limited time, and, should they 
cease to be under surveillance, to notify the danger zones as soon as 
military exigencies permit, by a notice to mariners, which must also 
be communicated to the Government through the diplomatic channel 
Manifestly this article is very general in its terms 
Such terms as "every . possible precaution" seem to 
guarantee ample care for the peaceful shipping. 
The next clause provides that the mines "shall become 
harmless within a limited time," but no limit is named. 
The limit may, therefore, be hours, days, weeks, months, 
or perhaps years. The notice of mines not under sur-
veillance must be given "as soon as military exigencies 
permit." The belligerent must, of course, be the judge 
in most cases of "military exigencies." 
As Capt. Behr of the Russian delegation said, uncon-
trolled mines should in principle become harmless as 
soon as possible. "La diffi.cul te ne commence que 
lorsqu'on veut realiser ce principe." It is necessary to 
consider the technique of mine construction and the 
possibility of meeting the proposed requirements. Capt. 
Behr further maintained that a satisfactory solution 
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'vould require tin1e and cxperin1ent, but some regulation 
'vould then be valuable in calling attention to the n1atter 
of the necessity of further regulation at a ln.ter date. 
The discussion at The Hague in 1907 is sum1narized in 
the report as follo,vs: 
~Ialgre le caractere plus ou mains vague des -differentes obligations, 
enoncees dans !'article 6, on a ete d'accord sur leur efficacitc, attendu 
que tout etat se fera certes un devoir de les observer rigoureusement, 
en procedant notamment le plus tOt possible aux notifications deere-
tees, des que les exigences militaires lui permettront dele faire. Quant 
aux conditions de construction, dont parle l'alinen 2 de !'article et "au 
laps de temps limite" qui y est prevu, tout en f·tant unanime, que la 
fixation de ce delai appartient a l'etat, qui a pose des mines amarrees, 
afin que ces mines ne continuent pas a etre dangereuses longtemps 
apres la fin des hostilites, on a longuement discute la possibilite, au 
point de vue technique, de suffire a ce::J obligations. Le Capitaine de 
V aisseau Ottley rappela a ce propos "que les lois de 1' action electro-
galvanique entre deux metaux dissemblables, en immersion, pretent 
un moyen facile et non couteux de changer·meme les coques des mines 
existantes, afin d.e satisfaire ala condition de !'article 6; il suffirait de 
percer un trou d'une grandeur de quelques centimetres dans la coque 
d'une mine et de fermer le trou par Ull bouchon en metal, tel que le 
zinc; en variant le caractere metallique du disque et en modifiant son 
epaisseur, on pourra regler plus ou mains la periode, pendant laquelle 
la mine restera flottante et active; plus le disque sera mince, plus la 
vie active de la mine sera courte." 
Ces constatations, presentees par la Delegation britannique dans une 
des dernieres seances du comite, ne rencontrerent pas d'objections de 
la part des autres delegues techniques presents; neanmoins, on ne crut 
pas pouvoir accepter la proposition, renouvelce par la Delegation 
britannique, de supprimer les mots "dans la mesure du possible" qui 
avaient ete adoptes auparavant. (Deuxieme Conference Interna-
tionale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 418.) 
There are some 'vho maintain that the anchored con-
tact mine may be and is more dangerous than the un-
anchored contact 1nine, saying: 
The unrestricted use of anchored contact mines in open shallow seas 
will prove such a menace to all vessels which traverse such waters, 
that their entire prohibition seems imperative for the safety of neutrals. 
Free distribution of anchored contact mines will deny navigation of 
such waters to all commerce during the period of hostilities and for an 
unlimited time after hostilities have ceased. The very fact that such 
mines will have to be laid in open shallow waters under cover of dark-
ness or fog precludes accurate location of them, precludes accurate 
information of such mine ,dangers to innocent commercial vessels, and 
precludes removal of all such mines at the close of the war. Inaccu-
rately located mine fields present a greater danger to shipping than a 
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poorly charted reef, because a mine field laid quickly at night some 
distance from fixed observation marks would be a worse menace to 
navigation than a reef surveyed under similar adverse conditions. 
The loose uncontrolled buoyant contact mine is a terrible menace to 
human life and to neutral commerce-and such drifting buoyant mines 
will remain a danger to shipping throughout vast areas of the sea for a 
long time after peace hag been declared. 
Unanchored contact mines ("floating" mines) being of a buoyant 
type can be designed with a positive limitation of operative life 
that is, they can be made to become harmless by sinking after being 
in the water for a fixed period of time. Thus the "floating" or un-
anchored contact mine would not be a lasting menace to neutral ship-
ping as would be the case with drifting mines of the anchored contact 
type. Nor would floating mines present as much danger to neutrals as 
securely anchored contact mines, for the reason that the former (owing 
to their limited operative life) would be laid in the immediate area of 
hostilities, which in itself would be sufficient warning of danger to 
neutral vessels, while on the other hand the hidden anchored mine 
fields might be laid anywhere on soundings, be very poorly charted, 
and probably without timely warning to neutrals. It would not be 
difficult to warn neutral vessels away from areas where "two-hour" 
floating mines have been strewn, but would a belligerent divulge to 
neutrals the location of fixed mined areas and thus run the risk of this 
information finding its way to the enemy? 
While the above position sedms extrema to some, it is 
nevertheless necessary to observe the fact that during the 
Russo-Japanese 'var, the drifting mines caused great 
damage even in a maritime area 'vhere there 'vas com-
paratively little shipping. If a like situation should arise 
in the vicinity of a great sea route, the results are serious 
to contemplate. Whatever the vie'v in regard to the 
matter of anehored co~tact mines if they are not to be 
entirely prohibited, the regulations as to their use should 
be clear and comprehensive. 
There are conditions for which it seen1s difficult to pro-
vide adequate safeguards. Such 'vould be the case 'vhen 
a vessel, approaehes a mined area in a fog. The vessel on 
guard to 'varn innocent vessels n1ay not discover the 
approaching vessel or n1ay be in doubt as to its identity. 
The same condition may arise in a storm or in darkness. 
The notification by public announce1nent of the general 
area of mining operations may be of little service to the 
neutral or innocent vessel unless it is of a nature to give 
such information to the opposing belligerent as to make 
the mining operations of little use to the belligerent plac-
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ing the mines. For if sufficiently definite information for 
safe na"Vigation is given in the notification this informa-
tion 'viii equally serve the other belligerent. It 'vould 
seem therefore that the notification 'vould necessarily be 
such as to define in general terms the mined area, the 
conditions of entrance, etc., and until this information 
can be presumed to be kno,vn to innocent shipping there 
should be a vessel or vessels stationed in the neighbor-
hood to warn approaching shipping. 
- From the discussion it is evident that the regulations 
in regard to precautions for the safety of peaceful ship-
ping should be more specific in order that the innocent 
shipping may be properly protected and in order that the 
belligerent may kno'v when he has conformed to require-
ments. 
Conclu.sion.-The follo,ving regulation may be proposed 
for safeguarding peaceful shipping against the dangers of 
mined areas : 
VVhen anchored automatic contact mines are employed 
every possible precaution must be taken for the security 
of peaceful shipping including-
1. An advance not~ce to foreign governments and to 
mariners specifying the general limits of the mined area. 
2. Provision for 'varning peaceful vessels approaching 
the n1ined area. 
3. Specification of the time during 'vhich the mines 
'viii be dangerous. 
The same precautions should be taken in the use of 
mines by neutrals. 
Use of mines by neutrals .-The demand for the use of 
mines by neutrals was particularly emphasized by the 
Brazilian and by the :K ether lands delegates at The Hague 
in 1907. 'rhe Brazilian delegate advocated the use of 
mines by neutrals for the guaranteeing of respect for 
their neutrality. The X ethcrlands delegate directed 
attention not 111erely to the preservation of neutrality, 
but also to the fulfillment of neutral obligations. The 
report contains a resume of the points of vie'v: 
L'idee fondamentale contenue dans ces deux propositions etait la 
meme; la proposition bresilienne linlitait seulement davantage, quant 
a leur espece, les mines que les neutres pourraient employer. 
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S. Exc . le Yice-Amiral Roell attira }'attention de la sous-commission 
sur la necessite de reglementer cette matiere et cela a Ull double point 
de vue; d'un cote, pour reconnaitre expressement la faculte des neutres 
de poser des mines, en vue de preserver leur neutralite, tout en leur 
permettant en me me temps de se conformer aux devoirs, qui leur in-
combent vis-a-vis des deux belligerants, de }'autre cote pour leur 
imposer, quant a }'usage des mines, les memes obligations qui seraient 
imposees aux belligerants, dans l'interet de la navigation pacifique. 
Le Capitaine de Fregate Burlamaqui expliqua a son tour la necessite 
de completer dans ce sens le projet britannique, qui ne paraissait avoir 
en vue que les belligerants; il insista, en meme temps, sur la necessite 
d'une notification par les neutres, generale ou speciale, selon les cir-
constances du moment, des regions dans lesquelles ils auraient place 
des mines. II invoqua, a l'appui de ces considerations, les decisions 
prises par l'Institut de Droit International dans la session de Gand et 
les opinions de plusieurs auteurs, connus en matiere du droit des gens; 
il conc]ut en faveur de la faculte, pour les Etats neutres, de poser des 
mines en vue de leur droit primordial de conservation. (Deuxieme 
Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 419.) 
Discussion on other important points is summarized in 
the report: 
.Jiais on se demanda, si !'assimilation des neutres aux belligerants 
devait aussi s'etendre quant aux lieux ou des mines sous-marines 
pourraient etre mouillees et si les precautions a prendre par les neu tres 
ne devaient pas etre plus precises et plus rigoureuses que celles 
prevues pour les belligerants. Le Contre-Amiral Arago exposa que, 
quant a ce qui concerne les neutres, il faudrait se contenter de leur 
permettre la pose de mines seulement dans la zone de trois milles; il 
serait encore necessaire de les obliger a donner avis prealable .a la 
navigation des lieux, ou ils voudraient poser des mines, et de notifier 
cet avis d'urgence aux autres Gouvernements; les raisons militaires, 
dit-il, qui donnent plus de latitude aux belligerants, ne peuvent pas 
etre invoquees pour les neutres; la zone de dix milles a ete accordee 
aux belligerants surtout en vue du danger de voir leurs ports bom-
bardes par les forces navales ennemies; ce danger n'existe pas pour 
les neutres. La latitude accordee aux belligerants, quanta la notifica-
tion, repond a des exigences de guerre imperieuses; le neutre ne se 
trouve pas dans pareille situation; il peut toujours notifier et il doit 
le faire d'avance, parce que ses eaux sont censees etre ouvertes au libre 
passage des navires pacifiques. 
Aux objections, tirees du droit des neutres de se defendre dans la 
meme mesure que les belligerants et de la possibilite qui devrait etre 
accordee aux neutres en vue de se preparer eventuellement ala guerre, 
il fut repondu que les neutres n'ont pas a se defendre, ils n'ont qu'a 
defendre leur neutralite, ce qui n'implique pas une egalite de droits 
avec les belligerants. Quant aux preparatifs pour une guerre cven-
tuelle il serait evident que ces preparatifs ne sont pas vises par les 
dispositions restreignant les neutres a poser des mines dans une zone 
de trois milles. (Ibid, p. 420.) 
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The result of the vote sho,ved practically no difference 
of opinion upon the main points, and the conference 
adopted a general regulation embodied in article 4: 
Any neutral power which lays automatic contact mines off its coasts 
must observe the same rules and take the same precautions as are 
imposed on belligerents. The neutral power must inform mariners by 
a notice issued in advance where automatic contact mines will be laid. 
This notice must be communicated at once to the Governments through 
the diplomatic channel. 
Conclusion.-The laying of 1nines by a neutral State 
should not be prohibited. 
Provision for exe-1nption from rules as to mines.-While 
the rules of the IIague convention relative to the laying of 
automatic contact subn1arine mines 'vere not very strict, 
there 'vere son1e States 'vhose delegates were not prepared 
to accept even these regulations. To meet the demands 
of these States, article 6 'vas adopted: 
The contracting powers which _do not at present own perfected mines 
of the type contemplated in the present convention, and which con-
sequently could not at present carry out the rules laid down in articles 
1 and 3, undertake to convert the materiel of their mines as soon as 
possible, so as to bring it into conformity with the foregoing require-
ments. 
The staten1ent of the position in support of this arti-
cle 'vas more fully made by the Austrian delegation 1n 
presenting the amendment upon 'vhich the article rs 
based: 
La marine austro-hongroise ne dispose pas, a l'heure qu'il est, de 
mines automatiques de contact amarrees remplissant la condition 
prevue par !'article 1 er, 2e alinea, du texte arrete sur la base des 
deliberations du comite d'examen, a savoir de devenir inoffensives 
des qu'elles auront rompu leurs amarres. Pour se conformer a la 
clause dont il s'agit, la marine austro-hongroise se trouve done dans 
la necessite de proceder a une transformation de son materiel de mines. 
Pour cette transformation la Delegation d 'Au triche-Hongrie ne saurait, 
cependant, accepter ni le delai de trois ans propose, ni tout autre 
delai fixe a l'avance, une mesure de ce genre contenant, indepen-
damment de la volonte personnelle, un element d'incertitude qui, tant 
qu'il subsiste, s'oppose evidemment a prendre a ce sujet un engage-
ment formel que l'on ne serait, peut-etre, pas a meme de remplir. 
Dans tout prefectionnement en matiere technique, l'epoque ou l'on 
parviendra a trouver une solution satisfaisante a un probleme que l'on 
se propose de resoudre ne saurait guere etre indiquee al'avance. 1Ieme 
si le principe scientifique sur lequel repose !'invention a faire etait, 
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au point de vue theorique, des plus simples, des obstacles absolument 
imprevus et qu'il est bien souvent difficile de vaincre peuvent, a tout 
bout de champ, venir en traver la realisation pratique de I 'idee. 
Aussi ne faut-il pas perdre de vue que dans le cas qui nous occupe, il 
ne serait point suffisant de construire un appareil de fonctionnement 
exact, au moyen duquel une mine ayant rompu son amarre flit auto-
matiquement rendue inoffensive; il s'agit egalement, et ceci ne me 
semble pas de moindre importance, de donner a l'appareil en question 
une construction telle que les autres parties mecaniques de la mine 
n'en soient point alterees au prejudice de sa valeur militaire, que 
la mine reste simple et non dangereuse a manier et qu'elle ne cesse 
de fonctionner d'une maniere slire et efficace. Ce n'est qu'apres avoir 
eprouve, a ces differents points de vue, l'appareil a construire, ce qui 
selon toute probabilite necessitera une serie de longues experiences, 
que l'on pourra se mettre a la transformation du materiel de mines et 
indiquer alors approximativement l'epoque a laquelle cette op~ration 
pourra etre terminee. 
Or, si, telles que les choses se presentent, nous voulions fixer, des 
maintenant, par voie conventionnelle, un terme pour la mise en usage 
des mines perfectionnees, et si a I' expiration du delai la transformation 
en question n' etait pas encore executee par une des Puissances con-
tractantes, cette derniere se trouverait en presence d'une situation des 
plus embarrassantes. Car elle devrait, si une guerre venait a eclater 
dans l'intervalle, ou renoncer a l'emploi des mines qui n'ont pas encore 
ete soumises ala transformation, ou bien manquer a !'engagement con-
ventionnel. L'une et l'autre de ces eventualites doivent necessaire-
ment etre ecartees. II nous semble done que si l'on prend au serieux 
!'engagement qu'il s'agit de contracter, on ne saurait accepter, dans 
l'espece, un delai fixe a l'avance. 
Dans cet ordre d 'idees la Delegation d 'Autriche-Hongrie se permet 
de proposer les a1nendements suivants: 
Article premier.-Ajouter a l'alinea 2 la disposition suivante: 
Les Puissances maritimes qui ne disposent pas encore de ces mines 
perfectiunnees et qui, par consequent, ne sauraient actuellement 
s'associer a cette interdiction, s'engager'it a transformer, aussitot que 
possible, leur materiel de lllines a:fin que ces dernieres repondent a la 
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ARTICLE D.-Supprimer cet article. 
Le fait que la transformation des mines s'i1npose non seule1nent par 
des considerations humanitaires, mais aussi par !'interet n1eme des 
Puissances, offre une garantie suffisante que I' engagement formule dans 
la proposition ci-dessus soit fidelement execute. De cette fa~on le but 
humanitaire auquel on aspire sera realise des qu'il y aura moyen de le 
faire. Agir autrement et accepter de& maintenant ur Jelai determine 
pour la transformation des n1ines, ce serait, de l'avis.de la Delegation 
d' Autriche-Hongrie, prendre un engagement avec une restriction 
mentale, ce qui evidemment ne serait guere en harmonie aYec !'obli-
gation absolue decoulant d'une stipulation conventionnelle. 
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Quant aux mines non-amarrees dont il est question au premier alinea 
de I' article 1 er de la Delegation d 'Autriche-Hongrie, s'assoclant entiere-
ment aux observations presentees a ce sujet par le Delegue naval de 
Grande-Bretagne, estin1e que l'on pourrait bien se passer d'une dispo-
sition analogue a celle dont il vient d'etre parle ou de toute autre dispo-
sition contena ut la fixation d' un terme. 
En ce qui concerne la disposition _de 2e alinea de !'article 5, la 
Delegation d' Autriche-Hongrie s'abstient de toute proposition, Ia 
clause en question lui paraissant, en principe, inacceptable. (Ibid., 
p. 673.) 
There "·ere propositioes to fi.x a limit of time for trar~s­
forination of mines not meeting the requirements of the 
proposed regula tior s n s one year for unanchored mines 
and three years for anchored n1ines or one year for all 
mines. 
It is plain that as most po"·ers did not disclose the type 
of mines "·hich they possessed almost any po,Yer might 
contend thQ. t it had not had time for conversion of its 
mines. The expression, "as soon as possir le," ,,·hich 
should determir:e the limit of the period for conversion to 
the prescribed type might allo\Y, as some pnrties nssumed 
it "'"ould, an indefinite period. In fact this clause in most 
respects renders the convention of little use except as a 
statement of w·hat may be desired and as a project "Thich 
may become the basis of further discussion. Ho,,·ever, 
there ,,·ould ce a just ground for maintaining that seven 
years would be sufficient time for any State intending to 
act "as soon as possible" to carry out the conversion of 
mines into the type required in the convention. 
Oonclu.sion.-.A.rticle 6 of Convention \TIII should not 
be continued in force. 
Use of torpedoes .-The Russian delegation proposed an 
amendment to the original project submitted by Great 
Britain to the effect that-
Les torpilles seront construites de fa~on ace que, en tant que cela est 
possible, elles deviennent inoffensives, lorsqu'elles auront manque 
leur but. 
The 'vords "en tant que cela est possible" "·ere not 
acceptable, lut the idea embodied in the remaining part 
of the clause \vas introduced "'"ith little discussion into 
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the first article of the convention. The report of the 
committee says of this subject: 
Quant aux mines automatiques de contact amarrces et aux torpilles 
automatiques, I' entente fut, en ce qui concerne leur construction, plus 
facile a etablir. La proposition russe sur les torpilles autornatiques 
(annexe 18) fut adoptee a l'unanimite avec suppression des mots 
"autant que possible" qui figuraient dans !'interdiction proposee par 
la Delegation Imperiale, concernant l'emploi de pareilles torpilles, qui 
ne deviennent pas inoffensives lorsqu'elles auront manque leur but." 
(Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 404.) 
Recently there has teen objection to the restriction 
imposed upon the use of torpedoes. Some regard these 
as propelle~ mines and under a measure of control, be-
cause their speed, direction, and time of sinking may te 
regulated 'vith much greater degree of certainty than in 
the case of unanchored mines. Unanehored mines are 
usually of simple and inexpensive co11struction as com-
pared 'vith the elaborate and expeLsive torpedo. Un-
anchored mines are much more at the mercy of the cur-
rent and may drift in any direction. The torpedo may 
be directed for a cor siderable time and its mechanical 
corstruction is such that it can te made to sink at a fixed 
time 'vith a great degree of certainty that there 'vill 1= e no 
mistake. The proposition has accordingly ceen made to 
allo'v to the torpedo a period equivalent to that allo"~ed 
to the u~lanchored mine on the following grounds: that 
from its nature the torpedo is more under control than 
the unanchored mine, that the present regulation is not a 
practicable one as there is no "~ay by 'vhich the belligerent 
at 'vhich the torpedo is aimed can tell 'vhether the torpedo 
has failed to hit its mark in most irstar..ces, and that it is 
inexpedient to discriminate in favor of the cheap and 
dangerous unanchored mine against the carefully con-
structed and controlled torpedo. 
Oonclusion.-The use of torpedoes should not be further, 
but should ce less, regulated if any change is made in the 
convention. 
General.-The Hague Convention VIII, 1907, relative 
to the laying of automatic contact submarine mines 'vas 
admitted to be tentative. There 'vas much difference of 
opinion in the conference 'vhich adopted the convention. 
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The interests of the po"~ers "~ere not identical. The 
ac~ual value of 1nines in n1aritin1e "~arfa.re "'"as a. 1natter 
of difference of opinion. The coupling of the idea of 
su bn1arine mine "-ith the idea of the torpedo ".,.as not alto-
gether logic~} ".,.ithout further distinction, as torpedoes 
'vould in general be n1ore con1pletely under control than 
"-ould son1e forn1s of 1nines. Uncontrolled and hidden 
perils like unanchored su b1narine 1nines or torpedoes of 
sin1ilar character should be prohibited outside the area of 
inunediate belligerent operations. At present it seen1s 
possible to dra"~ certain conclusions of a general character. 
Concl-usion.-( a) The use of su bn1arine 1nines should 
not be absolutely prohibited. 
(b) The use of unanchored automatic contact n1ines 
should be prohibited or n1ore definitely restricted. 1 
(c) The area "'"ithin 'vhich 1nines 1nay be placed should 
be deter1nined by regulation. · 
(d) \Yhen anchored auto1natic contact 111ines are enl-
ployed, eYery possible precaution 1nust be taken for the 
security of peaceful shipping, including-
1. An adYance notice to foreign goYerninents and to 
n1ariners specifying the generalli1nits of the n1ined area. 
2. ProYision for ".,.arning peaceful vessels approaching 
the 1nined area. 
3. Specification of the ti1ne during ".,.hich the n1ines 
'vill be dangerous. 
(e) The laying of mines by a neutral State should not 
be prohibited. 
(f) Article 6 of ConYention ·viii should not be con-
tinued in force. 
(g) The use of torpedoes should not be further but 
should be less regulated if any change is 1nade in the 
conYention. 
t Using the phraseology of 'I'he Hague Convention and 'introducing the nroposed 
changes, the following form may be suggested as meeting present requirements and 
opinions: It is forbidden to lay unanchored automatir contact mines except when they 
are so constructed as to become harmless one-half hour after those who laid them have 
lost control over them, and in every case before passing outside the area of belligeren 
activities. 
